Indeed, the fact that expressions of approval and disapproval are commonly observed in human interaction suggests that they must influence the behavior of at least some individuals. In recognition of the importance of informal sanctions, economists have integrated phenomena such as peer pressure (Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear, 1992; John M. Barron and Kathy Paulson-Gjerde, 1997) , and the avoidance of social disapproval (George A. Akerlof, 1980; Heinz Hollander, 1990; Assar Lindbeck et al., 1999 ) into theoretical models. Social pressures are thought to be a major factor behind high voter participation (Carol-Jean Uhlaner, 1989; Stephen Knack, 1992) and compliance with the law (Tom R. Tyler, 1990) .
In this study, we use experimental methods to study the power of informal sanctions. The context is a simple game called the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). The VCM is appealing because it starkly isolates the conflict between self-interest and group-interest and allows a simple measure of the halshs-00175251, version 1 -17 Feb 2012 Author manuscript, published in "The American Economic Review 93, 1 (2003) 366-380" extent of group-interested behavior. It has also been widely studied in the laboratory, facilitating the interpretation of our results within a large literature. In the version of the game that we consider, each player receives an identical initial endowment of money. Players simultaneously select a fraction of the endowment to contribute to a group account, while keeping the remainder. All funds in the group account pay a positive return to each member of the group. The parameters are chosen so that each agent has a dominant strategy to contribute zero to the group account, but at the group optimum, every agent contributes all of his endowment to the group account.
Experiments have documented that there is initially a positive level of contribution to the group account. 1 The level of contribution declines with repetition (Mark R. Isaac et al. 1985; Isaac and James M. Walker, 1988b; Andreoni, 1988; Joachim Weimann, 1994; Keser, 1996) and readily responds to changes in treatment variables. For example, contribution rates increase if communication between the parties is allowed before each play (see for example Isaac and Walker, 1988a or Elinor Ostrom et al., 1992) . See John O. Ledyard (1995) for a survey of previous studies.
It is known that a formal sanctioning system increases contributions. In a recent paper, Ernst Fehr and Simon Gaechter (2000) , hereafter FG, study the following two-stage game. In the first stage, four subjects play the VCM game described above. In the second stage, each subject, after observing each other group member's contribution, has an opportunity to reduce the earnings of any of the other players in his group, at a cost to himself. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium to the two-stage game, agents never punish because it lowers their own payoff, and because the punishment is not credible, there are no contributions in the first stage. In their experiment, however, FG observe that agents do exhibit a willingness to punish other members of their group, and that the availability of the punishment opportunity increases contributions markedly. The result is obtained under both Partner (in which the same players interact repeatedly) or under Stranger (in which players interact with different players each period) 2 matching protocols.
An obvious possible conclusion to draw is that the availability of monetary fines is the cause of the increase in contributions. We will refer to this interpretation, stated more precisely below, as the halshs-00175251, version 1 -17 Feb 2012 Direct Punishment Hypothesis (DPH) . 3 DPH will be supported, for example, if agents believe that a failure to contribute an amount others view as sufficient will result in punishment that will make lower contributions unprofitable. France. 6 The subjects were recruited from undergraduate courses in business and economics at both universities. Some of the subjects had participated in previous experiments, but all of the subjects were inexperienced in this particular type of experiment. No subject participated in more than one session of the study. On average, a session lasted 90 minutes including initial instruction and payment of subjects.
The experiment was computerized using the REGATE program developed at GATE.
Some information about the sessions is presented in Table 1 . The first four columns indicate the session number, the number of subjects that took part in the session, the location and the treatment in effect in the session, MP, NP, or NS. The Matching Protocol columns indicate whether Partner or Stranger matching was in effect during each of the three ten period segments that made up a session. The
Partner matching protocol was in effect for the first 10 periods of every session, and for the entirety of the four MP and the four NP sessions. Under the Partner matching protocol, the computer network separated the subjects into groups of size four. Group assignments remained constant for the entire session. Under the Stranger matching protocol, 7 which was in effect from period 11 on in the three NS sessions, halshs-00175251, version 1 -17 Feb 2012 participants were re-matched each period in new groups of four. It was common information that each subject had a zero probability of being matched with any given other individual for two consecutive periods as well as ever being grouped again with the same three people.
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[ During each ten-period segment subjects did not know whether or not the experiment would extend beyond the current segment. However, they knew the segment length and that each period in the segment would be identical. Thus, each ten period segment in MP or NP is most appropriately viewed as a ten period finitely repeated game. In periods 1-10 and periods 21-30 of each session, there was no punishment available. Activity in these periods proceeded as follows. At the beginning of each period, 
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In periods 11-20 of the four Monetary Punishment (MP) sessions, each period consisted of a twostage game in which the first stage followed exactly the same rules as in periods 1-10. At the beginning of the second stage, subjects were informed of the contribution levels of each of the other members of their group. They could then assign zero to ten punishment points to each of the three other group members.
Each point received by a subject from any other agent reduced the first stage earnings of the subject by 10 percent, with a maximum reduction of 100 percent. A subject observed the total number of points he received, but not how many each individual assigned to him. There was a cost to the agent assigning the points associated with each point allocated. The schedule of costs, denominated in ECU, is given in Table   2 .
10 Subject i's earnings in a period equaled is the cost to i of assigning the points to k. Contributions were listed in random order and without a running identification number on the screen each period so that it was impossible to target another player for punishment for more than one period. As indicated previously, in the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, whether it is played once or finitely repeated, all players always contribute zero and never punish.
[ Punishment Stranger (NS) sessions followed identical rules to periods 11-20 of MP, except that under NP and NS, each point awarded to an agent had no effect on her final earnings and was costless to assign. As in MP, each agent had the opportunity to assign between zero and ten points to each other group member.
The points represented the level of disapproval of a subject's contribution in the first stage. An allocation of ten points was to be assigned for the highest level of disapproval and zero points for the lowest level of disapproval. The points and their purpose were described to the subjects in the following language:
"In this stage you have the opportunity to register your approval or disapproval of each other group member's decision by distributing points. You can award a large number of points to any member of your group if you disapprove of his or her decision (10 points for the most disapproval, 0 points for the least disapproval.)"
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Under non-monetary sanctions, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in either the one-shot or the finitely repeated version of the game requires a level of contribution of zero, though any profile of point assignment is compatible with a subgame perfect equilibrium.
At the end of each period in all treatments, the computer displayed the subject's own initial endowment, own earnings from the first stage, own points received, own cost of points allocated (for MP), own overall earnings for both stages, each group member's contribution, and the total group contribution. The computer program then continued to the next period. 4, we replicate both of these earlier findings, and find that they carry over to non-monetary sanctions.
II. RESULTS

Figures
Result 4: The level of both monetary and non-monetary sanctions assigned by one individual to
another is increasing in (a) the negative difference of the contribution of the punished subject from the average level and (b) the negative difference of the contribution of the punished subject from the contribution of the punishing subject. Table 3 contains the estimates from the following regression model:
Support for result 4:
The first three columns in the table contain the estimates for periods 11-20, and the last three columns include only the data from period 20, the final period of the segment. sanctions k more, the further below the group average is k's contribution, as observed by FG. Both of these effects also carry over to the NP treatment, where the two coefficients are also highly significant.
All of the 1 β and 3 β coefficients have the same sign in period 20 as in 11-20 (though some are not significant due to fewer observations), indicating that the effects do not require repeated play.
[ Table 3 to the number of observations within that range of points received. In MP, agents who receive one or more points tend to increase their contribution, while those who receive zero tend to lower it. In NP and NS, agents who receive more than 15 points, 50 percent of the maximum possible, on average raise their contribution in the next period, while those who receive less than 15 points tend to lower it. Conjecture one asserts that even after taking into account an overall tendency for those who contribute less (more) than average to raise (lower) their contribution in the next period, the receipt of sanctions increases contributions of those who previously contributed less than the group average. We characterize the relationship as a conjecture because we cannot be certain that the points themselves, rather than some other variable correlated with the number of points received, cause the increase in contribution. for players who contributed more and less than the mean in period t. The 2 β estimates in Tables 4a and   4b show a significantly negative relation between the deviation from the average and the subsequent change in contribution in all six estimated equations. However, the 1 β estimates in Table 4a show that even after this effect is accounted for, both formal and informal sanctions raised contributions for individuals who contributed less than the average.
Thus a correlation exists between the receipt of punishment points and the subsequent net change in contribution for those who contributed less than the group average. The estimates in Table 4b suggest that greater monetary sanctions actually lowered the contributions of those who contributed more than average, perhaps because they reciprocated the punishment inflicted on them. Under NP and NS this pattern was not observed.
III. DISCUSSION
Our experiment provides an example of how cooperation can be enhanced purely by informal Positive contributions, the use of costly punishment, and changes in behavior in response to informal sanctions are all phenomena that are inconsistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium in which agents non-cooperatively maximize their monetary payoff. However, there are several models, which when taken together, begin to point to a coherent explanation of the behavior we observe. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that if some players are averse to inequities in payoffs, the availability of costly halshs-00175251, version 1 -17 Feb 2012 sanctions can increase contribution levels. The ERC model of Bolton and Axel A. Ockenfels (2000), which assumes that players are willing to sacrifice some absolute earnings to increase their earnings relative to other players, can also explain the application of costly punishment. However, these models, and indeed any approach that assumes that players' decisions consider only the pecuniary payoffs to themselves and others, cannot explain the increase in contribution from non-monetary sanctions.
Hollaender ( It appears that individuals tend to make higher contributions relative to the preceding period the more points they have received and the lower their contribution was relative to the group average. The presence of these patterns in NP and NS invites an analogy with the work of Kandel and Lazear (1992 ), Jon Elster (1998 ), and Bowles and Herbert Gintis (2001 who distinguish between internal peer pressure, called guilt, and external peer pressure, called shame. Guilt causes an individual to incur disutility from causing harm to others, and might be a factor in leading those who contribute less than the average to increase their contribution levels more than others. Shame, a disutility that occurs when others identify the individual as an offender, may be a factor that leads those who receive non-monetary sanctions to contribute more. One difference between a treatment with no punishment and with non-monetary punishment is that external peer pressure can be brought to bear, and our experiment suggests that external peer pressure can be a powerful force promoting cooperation.
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Bowles and Gintis (2001) model the VCM game with monetary punishment including both guilt and shame in the utility function of agents, in addition to own and others' pecuniary payoffs, and a preference for reciprocating others' contribution levels. If the receipt of points is assumed to induce shame, their framework explains the increase in contributions in response to the introduction of the sanctioning system in NP. The model is also consistent with higher contributions in MP than in NP, since MP has the avoidance of both shame and pecuniary penalties to promote contributions.
In the NP and NS treatments, players who received more than 50 percent of the maximum possible number of points tended to increase their contributions, while those who received less did not.
Furthermore, the relationship between the informal sanctions and the change in contribution was nuanced in that more points received corresponded to a greater increase in contribution. The number of points associated with an increase in contributions was greater than any one sanctioner, even assigning the maximum number of points, could impose. This is a sharp contrast to MP, where the receipt of merely one point was associated with an increase in the average individual's contribution. It may be that for informal sanctions to be effective in altering an individual's behavior, he must recognize that there is a degree of consensus among the other players that his contribution is inadequate. On the other hand, when a formal sanctioning system exists, one dedicated enforcer can keep contributions high.
halshs-00175251, version 1 -17 Feb 2012 than small groups. Toshio Yamagishi (1986) studied the effect of an exogenous sanctioning mechanism that was funded with voluntary contributions by group members and observed that the sanctioning system was indeed funded, and served to increase contribution levels. Sefton et al. (2000) 4 Gaechter and Fehr (1999) provide two pieces of evidence that approval incentives can increase contribution levels. The first is questionnaire data indicating that cooperation and freeriding trigger a high degree of approval and disapproval respectively. The second is data from an experiment in which interaction between subjects that creates familiarity before they play the VCM game, in conjunction with public revelation of contributions and discussion after the game is played, increases contribution levels.
Mari S. Rege and Kjetil Telle (2001) also find that revealing the identity of each group member publicly in a way that allows him to be associated with his contribution increases average contribution levels.
They also observe that framing the experiment with terms such as cooperation, free-riding, and community, that emphasize the pro-social nature of contributions, serves to increase average contribution levels.
5 There was one exception. Session number 10 was terminated due to a software crash after period 15. In that session, the data from 8 of 16 subjects for period 15 were also lost. Also, the data from period 15 for group 3 in session 2 was lost because of a computer problem and is not included in the data analysis.
halshs-00175251, version 1 -17 Feb 2012 6 The data from the two locations, which do not reveal large differences, are analyzed separately in David Masclet et al. (2000) . 7 Several previous studies have explored whether contribution rates are different between Partners or Strangers (when no punishment is available) but have not reached a clear consensus. Andreoni (1988) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996) find that Strangers contribute more than Partners, while Rachel T. A. Croson (1996) , Keser (1996) and Keser and van Winden (2000) find that Partners contribute more than Strangers, and Weimann (1994) finds no difference. See Andreoni and Croson (2000) for a review and survey of previous work in the area. As discussed previously, some of the rationale for the hypothesized effect of the disapproval points on contributions requires repeated interaction, which would suggest that Partner matching would yield higher contributions. On the other hand, Armin Falk et al. (2000), who study the same game as FG, find that the sanctioning pattern is similar under Partner and Stranger matching, and conclude that the main purpose of the sanctions is non-strategic.
8 Notice that our Stranger matching differs from random matching by assuring that two players are never in the same group for two consecutive rounds. While the Stranger matching protocol did not eliminate the possibility for preplay communication completely, it forced such communication to be much more indirect. 9 The same parameters were used in the FG study. At the group optimum, each me mber of the group contributes all 20 ECU, yielding a payoff of 32 ECU per person for the period. If every player follows his dominant strategy, each player receives a payoff of 20 ECU. 10 The cost for agent i indicated in the table represented the cost to i of points assigned by i to any individual agent k. That is, letting P ik equal the points that i assigns to k, the table indicates K(P ik ), the cost to player i of assigning the points to player k. The cost to i of assigning points to k and q, K(P ik + P iq ) =
K(Pik) + K(Piq).
